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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ASPECTS OF PETROLEUM AND MILITARY 
SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
 
DUANE CHAPMAN AND NEHA KHANNA 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Geologic estimates of remaining global petroleum resources place about 50% in the 
Persian Gulf.  Production costs are estimated at $5 per barrel there, and $15 per barrel in the 
North Sea and Alaska.  Using mathematical methods derived from depletion theory, the present 
value of economic rent from oil is on the order of $20 trillion.  Game theory is utilized to explain 
the $15-$20 per barrel price band that existed from 1986 to 1999.  New economic forces have 
displaced this previously stable pattern; a new price range of $22 to $28 may be emerging.  
International trade in petroleum and conventional weapons are analyzed with econometric 
methods; the occurrence of nuclear weapons capability in the Persian Gulf region is explored. 
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I.  Introduction 
In 1980, shortly after Saddam Hussein assumed the Presidency of Iraq, that country 
attacked Iran in the southwest Khuzistan region.  Iraq sought control over two major geographic 
goals: the Shatt-al-Arab channel, a shipping route for export of Iraqi oil; and the petroleum 
production facilities in Khuzistan, where more than 75% of Iran’s oil resources were located.1 
In 1990, Iraq occupied Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia.  If Iraq had been successful 
in these military actions, it would have controlled 40% of identified global reserves and 75% of 
Persian Gulf reserves (see Table 1).   
In 1991, U.S. President George Bush supported a U.S.-led U.N. military coalition which 
defeated Iraq, emphasizing that, “Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of 
friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves 
fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein” (Yergin, 1991, p. 773).  This military action eliminated 
Iraq’s potential to raise crude oil prices and attain quasi-monopoly profits.  Yet five years earlier, 
then Vice-President Bush had flown to the Persian Gulf, meeting with Saudi government 
ministers and the King.  The purpose of this 1986 trip had been to raise crude oil prices, which at 
the time were below $10 per barrel. 
The purpose of our analysis is to illuminate part of the economic rationale for these 
superficially contradictory U.S. policies.  We shall show the magnitude of the economic 
incentives for control of Persian Gulf oil, and also the logic which led the U.S. and some other 
OECD nations to work against crude oil prices below $15 per barrel, and above $20 per barrel 
for a 13- 
                                                 
1  See Yergin (1991) and the International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1983). 
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Table 1: Estimates of World Conventional Crude Oil Resources (billion barrels, 1993)  
 
Region/Country 
 
Identified Reserves 
 
Undiscovered 
Resourcesa 
 
Remaining 
Resources 
 
Persian Gulfb 
Saudi Arabia 
Iraq 
Kuwait + Neutral  Zone 
Iran 
UAE 
 
592.4 
258.6 
90.8 
99.4 
69.2 
61.1 
 
113.7 
50 
35 
4 
19 
4.2 
 
702.1 
308.6 
125.8 
103.4 
88.2 
65.3 
 
Former Soviet Union 
 
125.1 
 
100 
 
225.1 
 
United States 
 
51.1 
 
40.6 
 
91.7 
 
N. Sea - W. Europe 
United Kingdom 
Norway 
Netherlands 
 
37.3 
19.5 
17.1 
0.7 
 
12.3 
5.6 
6.7 
na 
 
48.9 
25.1 
23.8 
49 
 
Worldc 
 
1094.5 
 
427.7 
 
1513.3 
 
a:  modal value. 
b:  includes Oman, Brunei, Qatar, and Bahrain, in addition to the 5 countries mentioned. 
c: includes other regions and countries. 
na: not available 
 
Source: Masters et al. (1994).  Table 1. 
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year period from 1986 through 1999.  The same incentives operate now to create a new, higher 
price range of potentially comparable stability. 
The first section identifies the magnitude of economic rent (defined below) which 
partially motivates foreign policies of the Gulf countries and the U.S.  It uses game theory logic 
to explain the $15-$20 per barrel range in which crude oil prices usually moved.  The next 
section analyzes the framework now evolving toward a price range.  The third part analyzes 
global military trade in the context of petroleum imports and exports.  This is followed by a brief 
summary of the growth in nuclear weapons capability in the region.  Then we summarize the 
pre-1980 history of Gulf production and international relations.  We conclude with a discussion 
of future implications for the early part of this Century, and the likelihood of a near-term price 
range of $22 to $28 per barrel. 
 
II.  Petroleum Price, Rent, and Game Theory, 1986-1999 
In the petroleum economics trade literature, $5 per barrel is widely used as the likely 
equilibrium price in a theoretically competitive world oil market working without production 
quota agreements (Adelman, 1986 and 1993; The Economist, 1999; Yergin, 1991). 
Table 2 illustrates the production cost in a low-cost area in the Persian Gulf, and also for 
the North Sea.  “Production cost” here means exploration, development, lifting, and shipping 
costs to an OECD consumer.  It includes a normal return on investment (“profit”), and 
allowances for depletion and risk factors.  However, for purposes of discussion, assume average 
Persian Gulf cost is $5 per barrel, and North Sea (and Alaskan) cost is $15 per barrel. 
In other words, if the market price is $15 per barrel, a Persian Gulf producer earns “rent”  
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Table 2: Illustrative Production Cost 
 
 
 
Possible Low Persian Gulf 
Cost 
 
Possible North Sea Cost 
 
Investment in Development, 
amortized (including profit) 
 
55¢ 
 
$10 
 
Operations, lifting 
 
25¢ 
 
$5 
 
Shipping 
 
$1.50 
 
included in operations 
 
Total (rounded) 
 
$2.50 
 
$15 
 
Source:  Chapman and Khanna (2000) and Chapman (1993). 
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of $10 per barrel above the $5 per barrel production cost.  At $25 per barrel, the rent is $20. 
With Gulf production typically 6 or 7 billion barrels per year, total economic rent above 
production cost was on the order of $120 billion annually in early 2000. 
Mathematical techniques can be used in economic modeling to analyze the potential 
surplus or rent associated with use of the world’s remaining oil resources.  (Remaining resources 
are the sum of (a) identified reserves, and (b) geological estimates of undeveloped or unexplored 
petroleum resources).  Equation (1) shows the basic objective of a hypothetical monopolistic 
world oil industry: 
 
 
Maximize, with respect to qt and T  NPV =  

∑ r) + (1
t) ,q( C - q )qY ,N P t
ttttttt
T
1t=
,(
 (1) 
 
subject to   S. q t
T
=1t
≤∑
 
The logic is straightforward.  NPV is the net present value of rent, the excess of revenue above 
cost.  The demand functions P(N,Y,q) shift upwards over time in response to rising global 
population (N) and per capita income (Y).  Revenue is P*q, and cost is C. In the denominator, r 
represents the interest rate in calculating net present value.  Remaining resources are S.  The 
second line in the equation notes that future cumulative oil use cannot exceed remaining 
resources. 
The goal, then, is to maximize NPV for producers by finding T, the optimal length of 
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time for remaining production, and the best annual production levels qt.  (For a full explanation 
of this mathematical technique applied to world oil, see Chapman and Khanna, 2000, and 
Chapman, 19932.)  Of course the same method can be applied to an assumption of a competitive 
market.  The results are summarized in Table 3.  In Table 3, the magnitude of the present value 
of producers’ rent is generally $15 to $20 trillion.  (The exception, Case 4, has a lower NPV of 
$5.5 trillion). 
Gross World Economic Product now exceeds $30 trillion.  The magnitude of economic 
rent above cost for world oil producers is comparable but smaller.  The incentive for Iraqi-type 
military actions is clear, as is the incentive for OECD and other nations to oppose monopolistic 
or single-nation influence in the Persian Gulf. 
Notwithstanding the magnitude of economic surplus potentially available to a monopoly, 
crude oil prices were usually in the $15 to $20 per barrel range from 1986 through 1999.  A 
competitive market would have had lower prices (e.g. $5), and a monopolistic market would 
have higher prices (e.g. $30) during the last decade.  Yet, since the Bush trip to Saudi Arabia in 
1986, world oil prices were in the $15 to $20 range for 10 of the 13 years (MER, various issues). 
We believe that economic, political, and military factors led both OECD consumers and 
OPEC producers to prefer the $15-20 per barrel range, as summarized in Table 4.  Consider U.S. 
net imports of petroleum, which have risen slowly and have passed the 50% level for total  
                                                 
2  In these optimal control analyses, the problem is addressed with continuous rather than discrete 
functions.  With the utilization of the shift in demand functions that is induced by growth in population and per 
capita income, the solutions show (a) in all cases, a long period of accelerating use followed by decline, (b) prices in 
the near term are stable, declining slightly, or increasing, depending upon near term assumptions about production 
cost trend and the exercise of market power as analyzed in the game theory discussion following, and (c) near term 
price trajectories are all followed by continuing price rise. 
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Table 3: Economic Rent and Oil Use 
 
Case 
 
T: optimal production 
period until depletion 
(years) 
 
NPV: net present value of 
economic rent above cost  
(trillions) 
 
1.  Competitive market 
 
69 
 
$ 16.7 
 
2.  Monopolistic market 
 
92 
 
$ 21.5 
 
3.  Competitive market until 
     2030, then monopolistic 
 
81 
 
$ 16.2 
 
4.  Competitive, but 
      substitute biomass or coal  
      liquid fuels available at 
      $50 per barrel 
 
48 
 
$ 5.5 
 
5.  Monopoly with substitute 
     fuels available at $50 per 
     barrel 
 
55 
 
$ 14.9 
 
Source: Chapman and Khanna (2000) 
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             Table 4: General Economic Impact of Crude Oil Price Decision  
in a Game Theory Framework: 1986-1999 
 
Price per barrel 
 
OECD Countries 
 
Persian Gulf Oil Producers 
$10 or less • Higher GNP growth 
• Shut some domestic production 
• Greatly increased oil                    
   consumption 
• Much more imports 
• More pollution, climate change 
• End Persian Gulf political           
    support by OECD oil industry 
• loss of political support from       
   OECD oil industry 
• lower revenue, greater volume 
• faster depletion 
• higher market share 
$15 - $ 20 • stable GNP growth 
• stable OECD oil production 
• slow growth in oil consumption 
• slow growth in import share 
• stable prices 
• continued Persian Gulf support 
• continued OECD political,          
   military support 
• stable revenue, profit, rent 
 
$30 • decline in GNP growth 
• rapid near-term growth in            
   domestic production 
• stable or declining consumption 
• OECD Persian Gulf support        
   opposed by oil consumers 
• loss of OECD political, military  
    support 
• increased incentives for Central  
    Asia, other non-OPEC             
   production 
• less market share 
• less production, more profit, rent 
• greater payoff to successful Iraq- 
   type action 
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consumption.  The U.S. production is costly; production cost in the Persian Gulf is not.  
Consequently, low crude oil prices increase U.S. dependence on imports in two ways.   High cost 
U.S. production has to be shut down when crude prices are near $10 per barrel on a long-term 
basis.  Second, U.S. consumption of oil increases with lower prices.  The end result is that crude 
prices in the $15 to $20 per barrel range avoided financial loss for American oil producers, 
slowed the decline in U.S. production levels, and encouraged U.S. political support for Persian 
Gulf governments threatened by Iraq or other forces seeking monopoly power over Persian Gulf 
oil.3 
Consider Japan’s position in supporting the military defense of Kuwait by the U.S.-led 
operation.  Japan imports essentially all of its petroleum.  Three-fourths of its crude oil has 
originated in the Persian Gulf region (USEIA, 1994, p. 52).  In the short run, it would benefit 
from a $5 to $10 per barrel world price.  But, if Persian Gulf oil drives out U.S. and North Sea 
producers, the resulting monopoly-influenced price would increase significantly.  With a long 
run perspective, Japan can depend upon stable prices and political stability for its supply, both 
supported by the U.S. (Yergin, 1991, pp. 759-760). 
 Table 4 lays out these and related points in a game theory framework.  Both Persian Gulf 
and OECD governments were accustomed to the $15 to $20 per barrel price range.  Either group 
acting alone could, for a short period, force prices in either direction.  However, both groups had 
incentives to keep prices in this range.  This is similar to the game theory concept of Nash 
Equilibrium: a status quo where neither side can improve its overall situation by changing its 
strategy.  An initiative by either group acting alone, if opposed by the other side, leads to 
                                                 
3  This discussion of Table 4 is based upon the game theory analysis in Chapman and Khanna (2000). 
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consequences which leave the initiator worse off than previously.  A game theory approach is 
intended to represent the previously noted interaction of politics, military defense, and 
economics in world oil markets.  This $15 to $20 per barrel level was far below a true monopoly 
price.  It was also far above a truly competitive world price.  The outcome in one narrow facet 
resembled a competitive market: world price was about at the level where it equaled the 
marginal cost of high cost producers. 
In 1998, cash prices for Persian Gulf oil declined to $10 to $15 per barrel.  The primary 
cause may have been a cessation of accelerated growth in petroleum consumption in Asia.  
Throughout most of that year, futures prices remained within the $15-$20 per barrel range.  With 
the downward pressure on 1998 cash prices, the 1999 response could be anticipated which would 
raise crude oil  prices. 
 
III. 2000: Evolution to a Higher Price Band 
As the year 2000 began, Jaffee and Manning reported in the policy journal Foreign 
Affairs their prediction of "The high probability of oil prices in the $12 to $20 range over most of 
the next two decades…."  Their analysis was in sharp contrast to ours, published in this journal 
at the same time (Chapman and Khanna, 2000).   
In early 2000, crude oil prices had risen from a low of $10 in late 1998 to a high of $34 in 
early 2000, and temporarily stabilized near $25.  The U.S. Energy Secretary had negotiated with 
Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and some OPEC members, seeking a new political agreement on a higher 
price band to replace the old $15 to $20.   
The President of OPEC recently articulated the political economy of the game-theory 
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framework analyzed by us above and in earlier publications.  An extensive excerpt follows 
(NYT, April 2000): "If prices fall below $22, we will cut production to push prices back up.  
When prices are above $28, we will increase production." 
Several trends converged to move the game theory equilibrium to a higher price range.  
Inflation since 1986 would restate the $15 to $20 target range as $22 to $29 in year 2000 
dollars.4 This matches nearly perfectly with the current target price range.  On the OPEC/PG 
side, a feeling of entitlement to inflation-adjusted prices seems to be matched by an OECD 
acceptance of the validity of this point. 
 Notwithstanding the new and higher price range, the ability of Europe and North 
America to respond to high prices by increased production in Alaska and the North Sea is 
increasingly weakened.  Alaskan production is reduced by 50% from its 1988 peak (MER, 
2000).  In the North Sea, increased production may be financially and physically feasible, but 
Norway's coordination with OPEC reduces the competitive power of this option. 
 Within the international oil industry, the acquisition of Mobil, Amoco, ARCO, and 
Standard of Ohio by Exxon and British Petroleum has eliminated the potential competitive 
influence of four previously independent major global oil companies.  Exxon, BP, and Royal 
Dutch Shell are no longer in an adversarial position with Persian Gulf countries with respect to 
price. 
 BP, because of its dominant position in Alaska and its major positions in the North Sea 
and the Persian Gulf, is particularly well placed to benefit from and implement new pricing 
arrangements. 
                                                 
4  Assuming the GDP deflator increases about 44% from 1986 to mid-2000.  The increase to 1999 was 42% 
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 As noted, Norway does not see itself as a price competitor.  Mexico as well as Norway is 
now coordinating production planning with Persian Gulf and OPEC countries. 
 On the demand side, continued growth in U.S. petroleum consumption and the 
resumption of growth in Asian consumption has resumed the pattern of continuously rising 
demand curves.  Each year, at any given price, more petroleum will be consumed than 
previously.   
 Taken together, these six factors (inflation, the decline in Alaskan and U.S. output, the 
stabilization of North Sea production, Norway and Mexico coordination with OPEC, 
consolidation among major oil companies, and the resumption of upwardly shifting demand 
curves) combine to create a new calculus.5  The game theory framework is still intact, but the 
new price range has been articulated as $22 to $28 (in current dollars), rather than the prior $15 
to $20 range. 
 It is too early in the evolution of this new stage to be confident.  Nevertheless, we 
speculate that target prices will continue to define OPEC/PG-OECD policy in the near future.  
The price-per-barrel values in Table 4 should be redefined accordingly. 
 The same logic on each side continues.  For example, the U.S. Congress threatened to 
terminate U.S. military support to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  The U.S. Secretary of Energy 
negotiated with Persian Gulf, OPEC, and Mexican governments.  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
other Persian Gulf countries led OPEC, Norway, and Mexico to increase production and lower 
prices in March 2000 (NYT, March 2000). 
                                                                                                                                                             
(ECRP, SCB 2000). 
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5  In addition, the U.N. control of Iraqi production and the decline of Russian production have reduced 
output from these traditional major producers (MER, 2000). 
 The duration of the new $22 to $28 target price range is uncertain.  However, the game 
theory logic continues intact beyond the demise of the old 1986-1999 price range.  
 
IV.  Arms Trade and the Oil Economy 
 The economic incentive underlying military activity in the Persian Gulf has been 
established in the previous sections.  Here we examine the global arms trade in the context of the 
oil economy and determine the empirical significance of a few key nations in this context. 
 Based on a comprehensive global data set, Table 5 determines a fairly close empirical 
relationship between world trade in conventional weapons and the trade in crude oil and refined 
petroleum products: arms exports (imports) are highly correlated with oil imports (exports). 
Exploring this relationship are a pair of regression models based on a cross section of 121 
countries for 1995. The regression coefficients have the expected sign given the results in Table 
5.  Arms variables are measured in million dollars whereas the oil variables are in billion dollars. 
 Thus, according to these regression results, a $1 billion increase in total oil imports yields a 
$0.16 billion increase in the exports of conventional weapons, on average.  Similarly, a $1 
billion increase in the total volume of oil exports results, on average, in a $0.11 billion increase 
in the value of arms imports.  It is interesting that in both models variables measuring the size 
and overall economic health of the economy, namely GNP and GNP per capita, were found to be 
insignificant explanatory variables. 6  
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6  In the regression Equations (2) and (3), ARMEXP and ARMIMP are arms exports and imports.  
TOILIMP and TOILEXP are total imports and exports, and ε represents error terms.  The sources for these data are 
the same as those in Table 5.  The figures in parenthesis are the heteroscedasticity consistent t-ratios based on 
White's heteroscedasticity consistent standard error estimates.  See Greene (1997) for details.  As expected, no 
evidence of autocorrelation was found.  The regression slope coefficients are significant at the 5% level in both models. 
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients 
 
Correlation of 
 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
 
Arms exports       with     Oil imports 
Arms imports       with     Oil exports 
Total arms trade   with     Total trade 
Total arms trade   with     Total oil trade 
Total trade           with     Total oil trade 
 
0.74 
0.70 
0.69 
0.80 
0.81 
 
Variable definitions: All data are for 1995 
Arms exports (imports): value of conventional weapons exports (imports) 
Arms trade:                   sum of arms exports and arms imports 
Oil imports (exports):    total volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imports   
                                     (exports) 
Total trade:                   total value of merchandise imports and exports 
 
Data sources: ACDA 1997 and 1998, WTO 1999, USEIA 1996. 
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 ARMEXP  =  -294.56  +  159.95  TOILIMP  +  ε   R2 = 0.52  (2) 
   (-1.11)       (2.16) 
 
 
 
ARMIMP  =  -2.65  +  108.24  TOILEXP  +  ε   R2 = 0.51  (3) 
            (-0.03)    (2.32) 
 
 
To identify the key countries in this context, consider Table 6, which provides details on 
the value of arms transfers between the major supplier and recipient countries.  It is clear  
from this table that more than 50% of the global exports of conventional arms between 1994 and 
1996 originated in the United States, followed by the United Kingdom at a distant second.  Saudi 
Arabia was the single largest recipient of these weapons, receiving almost three as times as high 
a value of arms imports as the next highest recipient, Egypt.  Other countries in the Persian Gulf 
region, particularly Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, are also significant importers of 
conventional weapons, each receiving approximately $800-$1000 million per year.7 
Drawing together the statistics on arms trade presented above, the crude oil reserves data 
in Table 1, and country specific details on the imports and exports of crude oil and refined 
petroleum products (USEIA 1998), we can identify the key countries in the international oil- 
conventional weapons economy.  It is clear that, in general, the worlds largest arms exporters are  
                                                 
7  For detailed country specific arms imports and exports data see various issues of the World Military 
Expenditure and Arms Trade reports published annually by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. 
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Table 6:  Value of Arms Transfer Deliveries by Major Supplier and Recipient Country
(Cumulative 1994-1996, millions of current dollars)
       Supplier
      Recipient
Total US UK Russi
a
France Germ-
any
Chin
a
Other
NATO
Middle
East
Other
East
Europe
Other
West
Europe
Othe
r
East
Asia
All
Other
s
World 119,565 67,210 16,405 8,490 6,675 4,045 1,970 4,610 3,070 2,130 2,485 595 1,880
Developed
US
Israel
Russia
France
Germany
Japan
52,070
3,330
2,865
50
695
2,710
6,020
38,760
-
2,600
30
550
2,600
6,000
1,355
950
0
0
0
0
0
845
40
0
-
0
0
0
2,160
160
0
0
-
0
0
3,025
320
150
0
0
-
0
40
40
0
0
0
0
0
1,990
950
5
0
40
60
0
1,310
330
0
0
5
10
0
180
30
10
20
0
0
0
1,370
140
0
0
0
0
0
200
200
0
0
0
0
0
835
170
80
0
80
0
0
Developing
China
Taiwan
67,495
2,565
4,090
28,450
120
3,330
15,050
0
0
7,645
2,000
0
4,515
0
775
1,020
0
0
1,930
-
0
2,620
0
0
1,760
320
0
1,950
30
0
1,115
0
0
395
0
0
1,045
80
0
OPEC
Iran
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
UAE
36,080
1,025
3,405
26,585
2,270
15,150
0
1,900
11,700
800
12,915
0
675
11,200
260
1,625
320
750
0
200
3,040
0
60
2,000
750
190
0
0
60
0
525
500
0
0
0
940
10
0
775
0
85
10
0
0
0
310
80
20
0
20
860
10
0
850
0
150
50
0
0
40
290
5
0
0
200
NATO 25,525 18,150 1,195 230 1,300 1,470 40 1,785 580 45 275 200 255
Source:  ACDA, 1998.  Table III.
also the largest oil importers, whereas the countries with the largest remaining and identified  
crude oil resources are the largest recipients of these arms. 
 
V. Instability, Local Conflict, and Nuclear Weapons 
 The Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia are usually considered distinct 
regions.  However, a broader network of national tensions overlays the Persian Gulf region.  Five 
of the world's nuclear-capable countries have borders within 1600 miles of the Straits of 
Hormuz.8  In all cases, existing missile range capability makes nuclear aggression in the Persian 
Gulf region a technically feasible option (see Table 7).  The other two nuclear capable regions, 
the United States and the European Community, are both major importers of Persian Gulf oil. 
 Figure 2 shows countries with nuclear warheads and their oil production.  The apparent 
association is spurious, in the sense that crude oil production does not cause nuclear capability.  
There are at least seven sets of national rivalries that have involved nuclear-capable countries.9  
The simplest interpretation of the Figure is that most of the conflicts associated with nuclear-
capable countries have the potential of affecting the Persian Gulf.   
 Pakistan, though not a major oil producer, borders the Gulf of Oman and the Indian 
Ocean.  A nuclear conflict involving India and Pakistan would probably impact Persian Gulf 
shipping and perhaps production.  A Pakistan strategy might potentially involve the threat of  
                                                 
8  From West to East: Israel, Russia, Pakistan, India, China.  See map (Figure 1). 
9  Since World War II: Israel-Arab countries; Pakistan-India; India-China; Russia-U.S.; France and U.K.-
Russia; Russia-China; China-U.S. 
 
 18 
Table 7: Nuclear Weapons 
 
Name and history 
 
Arsenal 
(number of warheads) 
 
Representative Missile Range 
(miles) 
 
1.  Countries with declared nuclear weapons capabilities 
 
United States 
First test: 1945 
Total number of tests: 1,030 
 
 
United Kingdom 
First test: 1952 
Total number of tests: 45 
 
France 
First test: 1961 
Total number of tests: 210 
 
Russia 
First test: between 1945-1952 
Total number of tests: 715 
 
China 
First test: 1964 
Total number of tests: 45 
 
India 
First test: 1974 
Total number of tests: 6 
 
12,070 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
500 
 
 
 
 
22,500 
 
 
 
 
 
450 
 
 
 
65 
 
8,100  
 
 
 
 
7,500 
 
 
 
 
3,300 
 
 
 
 
6,800 
 
 
 
 
 
6,800 
 
 
 
 
 
1,500 
 
2.  Countries with undeclared nuclear weapons capabilities 
 
Israel 
Known to have bomb 
 
Pakistan 
Began secret program in 1972 
 
64-112 
 
 
 
 
15-25 
 
930 
 
 
 
 
930 
 
3.  Countries that terminated nuclear weapons programs 
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, South Africa.   
 
Source: Time Magazine, 1998. 
 


nuclear detonations in the Gulf to encourage OECD support for the Pakistani position on 
Kashmir. 
 Petroleum revenues received from the OECD by Gulf producers probably do not directly 
finance conflict in what, for lack of an established term, we might call the “Straits of Hormuz 
global sector”.  But individuals and organizations in the Gulf countries finance military 
operations in other countries in this sector.10 
 
VI.  A Historical Perspective on Persian Gulf Policy 
 Throughout the 20th century, the Gulf was of considerable interest to the U.S., European, 
and Russian governments.  The Anglo-Persian Oil Company preceded the British Petroleum 
Company.  Both companies worked to provide a secure supply of petroleum for the United 
Kingdom during the earlier decades of the century.  As was typical, British companies simply 
assumed the responsibilities of government in their concessions in Iran’s oil regions: customs, 
police, taxation, telegraph, education, and banking (Upton, 1961; Chapman, 1983).  Russia, on 
the other hand, sought, rather unsuccessfully, to promote Soviet republics in Northern Iran.  
From 1953 to 1978, Iran’s policies were coordinated with U.S. interests, as is well known (e.g., 
Yergin, 1991; Roosevelt, 1979). 
In Saudi Arabia, four U.S. oil companies established economic relations with the Saudi 
government.  Originally formed in 1933 as the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, 
ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) managed Saudi oil after WWII (ARAMCO, 1960; 
                                                 
10  It has been asserted that sources in Saudi Arabia and Iran support Muslim military operations in 
Kashmir (National Geographic, 1999). 
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Yergin, 1991).  While the companies no longer exert such control, the relations between the 
Saudi and the U.S. government remain strong, as discussed above. 
Each Persian Gulf country has an analogous individual history that fits into the larger 
mosaic of oil production and historical relations with European and U.S. companies and 
governments. 
 
VII.  Summary: Implications for International Policy 
Historically, Europe, the United States, and Russia have sought to secure access to 
Persian Gulf oil.  Its low cost and high volume of remaining resources continue to place the Gulf 
at the center of petroleum geopolitics.  The magnitude of economic rent above cost is on the 
order of $15-20 trillion. 
Military power has played a significant role in policy.  Iraq, in its invasions of Iran and 
Kuwait and its threat to Saudi Arabia, has sought control over one-half of the world’s remaining 
oil resources.  The U.N. alliance, led by the United States, eliminated Iraq’s military power, and 
continues to control Iraq’s military capabilities as well as its oil sales. 
Thus far, international policy in the Gulf is the result of diplomacy, military action, and 
economic relations, setting the $15-20 per barrel price range outlined above during the last 13 
years of the last Century and creating a higher target price range in 2000. 
Production from Alaska and the North Sea continues to decline while world consumption 
grows.  Mexico and Norway have initiated effective coordination with Saudi Arabia and OPEC 
(NYT, 1999).  The ability of OECD producers to increase production to force lower prices is 
lessened.  In addition, consolidation among major petroleum companies has reduced the 
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competitive potential of the industry. 
In combination with the resumption of upwardly shifting global demand functions and 
inflation, these six factors (see Sections II and III) keep the political economy/game theory 
structure intact, but raise the target price range to $22-$28 per barrel. 
In the late 1990s, weapons trade became closely associated with petroleum trade, as 
analyzed above.  As nuclear weapons capabilities slowly spread, an unexpected byproduct of 
national rivalries has been the creation of a geographic pattern in which five of the nuclear 
powers are within 1600 miles of the Straits of Hormuz.  The other nuclear powers are major 
consumers of Persian Gulf oil.  Iraq would probably have nuclear warheads today if not for the 
U.N./U.S. control over its military resources. 
We do not suppose that we can suggest or advocate practical new policies to stabilize 
politics, prices, and production.  We hope this analysis delineates some of the economic and 
security motivation for more explicit international policies in this context. 
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